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HIS Article addresses substantive criminal law. First, it discusses
recent and significant amendments to the Texas Penal Code by the
Texas Legislature. Most of these new amendments were effective
September 1, 1994, and no case law interpreting them has yet been writ-
ten. Second, this article compiles those particularly important decisions
from the 1993-1994 term of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that will
have a pervasive impact on the trial of criminal cases in Texas, as well as a
few relevant cases from the United States Supreme Court. The cases
cited and discussed in this article were selected either because 1) they
should have the most significant impact on the trials of criminal cases in
Texas, 2) they provide an excellent recapitulation of established legal
principles or 3) they reaffirm established caselaw that had come into
question or fallen into disuse. The cases are set out by topic, in the gen-
eral order in which they occur in the evolution of a criminal case.
I. SELECTED PENAL CODE PROVISIONS
This portion presents recent changes in the Texas Penal Code. There
have been numerous additions and revisions, including the addition of a
new class of punishment called the "state jail felony." Most of the
changes reflect the state's new policy that our jail cells should be reserved
for the most serious offenders. Because of limited space, this article will
only discuss the more significant changes.
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A. REQUIREMENT OF VOLUNTARY Acr OR OMISSION
A person may now be prosecuted for the failure to act where there is a
duty to act under any law, including constitutional law or a written opin-
ion of a court of record, and not just statutory law.'
B. SELF DEFENSE
The legislature eliminated the common law "right to arm yourself and
seek a peaceful resolution" defense. 2 Section 9.31(a)(5) was added to
prohibit the use of force against another if "the actor sought an explana-
tion from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's dif-
ferences with the other person while the actor was carrying a weapon in
violation of Section 46.02 [Penal Code]." '3
C. PUNISHMENTS
The legislature created a new punishment category called a state jail
felony, 4 which is essentially a fourth degree felony.5 A state jail felony
has a punishment range of 180 days to two years. 6 After a judge or jury
has assessed a sentence within this range, the judge must automatically
suspend the sentence and place the defendant on a period of community
supervision ranging from two to five years.7 The judge may, however,
require that the defendant serve short periods of time in county or state
jail as a condition of the community supervision.8
State jail felonies are listed throughout the Penal Code and largely con-
sist of previous third degree, low-level property felonies (such as theft of
property valued at $1500 or more, but less than $20,000, 9 forgery,10 credit
card or debit card abuse)," and some former misdemeanors (such as
criminally negligent homicide' 2 and criminal nonsupport 3). In addition,
some previously first or second degree felonies are now state jail felonies,
1. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(30), 6.01(c) (Vernon 1994).
2. Id. § 9.31 (amending § 9.31 (Vernon 1993)).
3. Id § 9.31(a)(5).
4. Id § 12.35.
5. A detailed analysis of the State Jail Felony system is beyond the scope of this
survey. For a full discussion of this system, see George E. West, The New Penal Code, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROF. DEV. PROGRAM, 1 ADVANCED CRIMINAL LAW COURSE G(1994).
6. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.35(a) (Vernon 1994).
7. TEX. CODE CrM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 15(a)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
8. Confinement, as a condition of the suspension, is limited to up to 30 days in a
county jail or 60 days in a state jail if a defendant has no prior felony convictions; up to 60
days in county jail or 180 days in a state jail if a defendant has one prior felony conviction;
or up to a year in a state jail if a defendant has 2 or more prior felony convictions or is
convicted of delivery of less than one gram of a controlled substance in penalty group 1.
See id art. 42.12, §§ (b), (c), (d).
9. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(4) (Vernon 1994).
10. Id § 32.21.
11. Id § 32.31.
12. Id § 19.05.
13. Id. § 25.05.
1995] 1081
SMU LAW REVIEW
such as burglary of a building other than a habitation,14 or possession and
delivery of less than one gram of a penalty group I controlled substance. 15
D. CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
1. Murder
The legislature eliminated voluntary manslaughter as an offense sepa-
rate from murder. 16 Revised section 19.02 makes voluntary manslaughter
a punishment issue where the defendant must prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that "he caused the death under the immediate influence
of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.' 17
2. Capital Murder
The legislature created three new categories of capital murder.'8 First,
revised section 19.03 makes it a capital offense to knowingly or intention-
ally murder a child under six years of age.19 Second, it is capital murder
for prison inmates to commit murder "with the intent to establish, main-
tain, or participate in a combination [prison gang] or in the profits of a
combination .... -20 Finally, a prison inmate commits a capital offense if
he murders another: 1) while incarcerated for murder or capital murder 2'
or 2) while serving a sentence of life or ninety-nine years for aggravated
kidnapping,22 aggravated sexual assault23 or aggravated robbery.24
E. KIDNAPPING
Section 20.04(c) was added to make the voluntary release of the victim
in a safe place a punishment issue that the defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence. 25 It is not an issue for the guilt/innocence
phase of the trial. 26
F. ASSAULT
Section 22.01 of the Penal Code was modified to simplify the assault
classifications. Causing bodily injury is now a Class "A" misdemeanor,
14. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(c)(1).
15. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.115, 481.112 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
16. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 Historical and Statutory Note; see also id
§ 19.04 Historical and Statutory Note.
17. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(d) (Vernon 1994).
18. Id § 19.03.
19. Id. § 19.03(a)(8).
20. id. § 19.03(a)(5)(B).
21. Id. § 19.03(a)(6)(A).
22. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.03(a)(6)(B), 20.04 (Vernon 1994).
23. Id. §§ 19.03(a)(6)(B), 22.021.
24. Id. §§ 19.03(a)(6)(B), 29.03.
25. Id. § 20.04(c).




and threatening injury or causing offensive contact is a Class "C"
misdemeanor. 27
G. SEXUAL ASSAULT
Section 22.011(b)(8) was added to make clear that sexual assault "is
without the consent of the other person if .... the actor is a public ser-
vant who coerces the other person to submit or participate. '28 Coercion
means threatening to commit an offense; to inflict bodily injury on any
person in the future; to accuse a person of an offense; to expose a person
to hatred, contempt or ridicule; to harm the credit or business repute of
any person; or to take or withhold action as a public servant. 29
The legislature eliminated the promiscuity of a victim between fourteen
and seventeen years of age as a defense to sexual assault 3° or indecency
with a child. 31 The affirmative defense that the actor was not more than




An aggravated assault is committed now by not only causing serious
bodily injury, but also merely exhibiting a deadly weapon.33 An offense
under this section is now upgraded from a third to a second degree fel-
ony.34 The offense becomes a first degree felony, however, if it is
committed:
(1) by a public servant acting under color of the servant's office or
employment; (2) against a ... public servant while the ... servant is
lawfully discharging an official duty, or in retaliation ... of an exer-
cise of official power or performance of an official duty.. .; or (3) in
retaliation against or on account of the service of another as a wit-
ness, . . . informant, or person ... report[ing] .. .[a] crime. 35
The actor is presumed to know the victim is a public servant if the servant
is wearing a badge or uniform.36
I. AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT
Section 22.021(a)(2)(v) was added to elevate sexual assault to aggra-
vated sexual assault if the defendant acts in concert with another.37 This
revision is primarily aimed at gang-type rapes.
27. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon 1994).
28. Id. § 22.011(b)(8).
29. Id. § 1.07(a)(9).
30. See id. § 22.011(d).
31. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (Vernon 1994).
32. Id §§ 22.011(e), 21.11(b)(1).
33. Id. § 22.02(a)(2).
34. Id § 22.02(b).
35. Id. § 22.02(b).
36. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(c) (Vernon 1994).
37. Id. § 22.021(a)(2)(v).
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J. INJURY TO A CHILD, ELDERLY INDIVIDUAL OR DISABLED
INDIVIDUAL
An affirmative defense was added for a defendant charged with injury
by omission.38 The defendant must show: 1) no evidence exists that the
defendant knew of any injury prior to the charged act and failed to report
it; 2) the defendant was a victim of family violence committed by a code-
fendant in the injury case; 3) the defendant did not actually cause the
injury; and 4) the defendant did not reasonably believe at the time of the
omission that an effott to prevent the offense would have an effect.39
K. DEADLY CONDUCT
Formerly entitled "Reckless Conduct," section 22.05 increases the pen-
alty for pointing a firearm in the direction of another to a Class "A" mis-
demeanor.40 Additionally, it is now a third degree felony to knowingly
discharge a firearm 1) at or in the direction of a person, or 2) in the
direction of a habitation, building or vehicle where the actor "is reckless
as to whether the habitation, building, or vehicle is occupied."'41 The
changes in this law were primarily made to address drive-by shootings.
L. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
The legislature has created a new value ladder in all value-related of-
fenses such as criminal mischief, theft, and theft of services:42
PUNISHMENT RANGE PREVIOUS VALUE NEW VALUE
Class C Misdemeanor Less than $20 Same
Class B Misdemeanor $20 or more, but less $20 or more, but less
than $200 than $500
Class A Misdemeanor $200 or more, but $500 or more, but less
less than $750 than $1,500
State Jail Felony N/A $1,500 or more, but less
than $20,000
3rd Degree Felony $750 or more, but $20,000 or more, but
less than $20,000 less than $100,000
2nd Degree Felony $20,000 or more, but $100,000 or more, but
less than $100,000 less than $200,000
1st Degree Felony $100,000 or more43  $200,000 or more
38. See id. §22.04(k)(2).
39. Id. § 22.04(k)(2).
40. Id. § 22.05(e).
41. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.05(b) (Vernon 1994).
42. See id §§ 28.03, 31.03, 31.04. A similar value ladder has also been used for the
following offenses: interference with railroad property, id. §28.07; illegal recruitment of
athlete, id4 §32.441; misapplication of fiduciary property, id. § 32.45; and securing execu-
tion of document by deception, id. § 32.46.
43. Prior to the 1993 amendments, criminal mischief and theft of services did not have




Burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit theft is now a second
degree felony, and burglary of a building other than a habitation with the
intent to commit a felony or theft is now a state jail felony. 4 However,
burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit a felony other than
theft remains a first degree felony.45 Burglary of a vehicle has been
downgraded from a third degree felony to a class "A" misdemeanor/ 6
N. THEFT
The legislature has adopted a new value ladder for theft that is similar
to the one used for criminal mischief.47 The definition of coercion has
been moved to the general definition section.48 Additionally, under sec-
tion 31.01, consent is not effective if "given by a person who by reason of
advanced age is known by the actor to have [ ]diminished capacity to
make informed and rational decisions about the reasonable disposition of
property. 49
0. BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE
Several changes were made in this chapter of the Penal Code. First,
"an expenditure made and reported in accordance with Chapter 305,
Government Code" is now included as a prohibited benefit.50 Second,
the legislature added a prohibition against offering or conferring a benefit
on a witness "to abstain from, discontinue, or delay the prosecution of
another witness." 51 Third, revised section 36.06 now prohibits harming or
threatening to harm another to prevent or delay the service of a public
servant, witness or informant.52 The previous version of the statute only
prohibited harming or threatening harm in retaliation.53 Fourth, section
36.07 was amended to allow public servants to accept meals, lodging, and
transportation expenses for engagements where the public servant ren-
ders services that are more than "merely perfunctory. ' 54 Fifth, the legis-
lature now allows public servants who receive unsolicited gifts to donate
the gift to the government or to a charitable organization. 55 Finally,
items under fifty dollars (excluding cash or a negotiable instrument) and
felony. Id. In this comparative chart, the 1st degree felony classification applied only to
theft. Id. § 31.03.
44. Id § 30.02 (c).
45. Id. § 30.02(d).
46. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.04(c) (Vernon 1994).
47. See supra part I(L).
48. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(9) (Vernon 1994).
49. Id § 31.01(3)(E).
50. Id. § 36.02(a)(4); see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 305 (Vernon 1988) (concerning
lobbying activities).
51. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.05(a)(5) (Vernon 1994).
52. Id. § 36.06(a)(2).
53. Id. § 36.06(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
54. Id § 36.07(b) (Vernon 1994).
55. Id. § 36.08(i).
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items issued by a governmental entity that allow the use of property or
facilities owned, leased or operated by the entity are exempted from sec-
tion 36.08 (gift to a public servant) and section 36.09 (offering gift to a
public servant).5 6
P. PERJURY & OTHER FALSIFICATION
The legislature rewrote section 37.08 to penalize a person who makes a
false statement to a peace officer conducting a criminal investigation, if
the statement is material to the investigation.5 7 Previously, the person
only committed an offense if he related a false incident to a peace
officer.58
Q. PUBLIC INDECENCY
The definition of "child" was raised from under seventeen to under
eighteen years old in sections 43.25 (Sexual Performance by a Child) and
43.251 (Employment Harmful to Children.)5 9
R. WEAPONS
A felon may not carry a firearm within five years of his release from
confinement or supervision, and then he may only carry it at the premises
where he lives.60 Formerly, a person convicted of a violent felony could
not possess a firearm away from the premises where he lived. 61 Addi-
tionally, section 46.06 was revised to prohibit a person from selling a fire-
arm to a felon within five years of the felon's release.62
S. INTOXICATION AND ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE OFFENSES
1. Definitions
The definition of "intoxicated" was modified as follows: "not having
the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduc-
tion of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combi-
nation of two or more of those substances, or any other substance into the
body."' 63 Additionally, the terms Motor Vehicle and Watercraft are now
defined. 64
56. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.10 (Vernon 1994).
57. Id. § 37.08.
58. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.08 (Vernon 1994).
59. Id. §§ 43.25, 43.251.
60. Id. § 46.04.
61. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04 (Vernon 1994).
62. Id. § 46.06(a)(4).
63. Id § 49.01(2)(A) (emphasis added).
64. See id. § 49.01(3), (4).
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2. Driving While Intoxicated
Driving while intoxicated (DWI),65 including flying66 and boating67
while intoxicated, has been moved to chapter 49 and standardized. The
first offense for any of the above offenses is a Class "B" misdemeanor
with a minimum term of confinement of seventy-two hours.68 If the de-
fendant commits an offense of driving while intoxicated under section
49.04 and is in possession of an open container, the minimum confine-
ment is increased to six days.69 A second offense for these offenses is a
Class "A" misdemeanor with minimum term of confinement of fifteen
days, and the third offense is punishable as a third degree felony. 70
3. Intoxication Assault and Manslaughter
If by reason of driving while intoxicated the defendant causes serious
bodily injury to another person, the offense becomes a third degree fel-
ony.71 If by reason of driving while intoxicated the defendant kills an-
other person, the offense is punishable as a second degree felony.72
T. ORGANIZED CRIME
Deadly conduct, assault punishable as a Class A misdemeanor, bur-
glary of a motor vehicle, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle were
added to the list of crimes that may constitute organized criminal
activity. 73
U. SELEcTED HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE PROVISIONS
1. Section 481.002(49)
"Adulterant and dilutant" are defined as "any material that increases
the bulk or quantity of a controlled substance, regardless of its effect on
the chemical activity of the controlled substance. ' 74
65. Id § 49.04(a).
66. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.05(a) (Vernon 1994).
67. Id. § 49.06(a).
68. Id. §§ 49.04(b), 49.05(b), 49.06(b).
69. Id. § 49.04(c).
70. Id § 49.09.
71. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.07 (Vernon 1994).
72. Id. § 49.08.
73. Id. § 71.02(a)(1).
74. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.002(49) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
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2. Revision of the Punishment Ranges, Sections 481.112 - 481.121
a. Possession: Penalty Group 175
NEW WEIGHTS &
PREVIOUS WEIGHTS PREVIOUS RANGES RANGES
Less than 28 grams 2nd Degree Felony State Jail Felony if
less than 1 gram
3rd Degree Felony
if 1 gram or more,
but less than 4
grams
28 grams or more, but 5-99 years or life & 2nd Degree Felony
less than 400 grams maximum $50,000 if 4 grams or more,
fine but less than 200
grams
1st Degree Felony if
200 grams or more,
but less than 400
gram
400 grams or more 10-99 years or life & Same
maximum $100,000
fine
b. Possession: Penalty Group 276
NEW WEIGHTS &
PREVIOUS WEIGHTS PREVIOUS RANGES RANGES
Less than 28 grams 3rd Degree Felony State Jail Felony if less
than 1 gram
3rd Degree Felony if 1
gram or more, but less
than 4 grams
28 grams or more, but 5-99 years or life & 2nd Degree Felony if 4
less than 400 grams maximum $50,000 grams or more, but less
fine than 400 grams
400 grams or more 10-99 years or life 5-99 years or life &
& maximum maximum $50,000 fine
$100,000 fine
75. Id. § 481.115.
76. Id. § 481.116.
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c. Possession: Penalty Group 377
PREVIOUS NEW WEIGHTS &
WEIGHTS PREVIOUS RANGES RANGES
Less than 200 grams Class A Misdemeanor Class A Misdemeanor if
less than 28 grams
3rd Degree Felony if 28
grams or more, but less
than 200 grams
200 grams or more, 5-99 years or life & 2nd Degree Felony
but less than 400 maximum $50,000 fine
grams
400 grams or more 10-99 years or life &
maximum $100,000 fine
5-99 years or life &
maximum $50,000
fine
d. Possession: Penalty Group 478
NEW WEIGHTS &
PREVIOUS WEIGHTS PREVIOUS RANGES RANGES
Less than 200 grams Class B Misdemeanor Class B Misdemeanor if
less than 28 grams
3rd Degree Felony if 28
grams or more, but less
than 200 grams
200 grams or more, 5-99 years or life & 2nd Degree Felony
but less than 400 maximum $100,000 fine
grams
400 grams or more 10-99 years or life & 5-99 years or life &
maximum $100,000 fine maximum $50,000 fine
77. Id § 481.117.
78. Id § 481.118.
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e. Manufacture or Delivery: Penalty Group 179
NEW WEIGHTS &
PREVIOUS WEIGHTS PREVIOUS RANGES RANGES
Less than 28 grams 1st Degree Felony State Jail Felony if
less than 1 gram
2nd Degree Felony if
1 gram or more, but
less than 4 grams
28 grams or more, but 5-99 years or life & 1st Degree Felony if
less than 200 grams maximum $50,000 fine 4 grams or more, but
less than 200 grams
200 grams or more, but 10-99 years or life & Same
less than 400 grams maximum $100,000 fine
400 grams or more 15-99 years or life & Same
maximum $250,000 fine
f. Manufacture or Delivery: Penalty Group 280
NEW WEIGHTS &
PREVIOUS WEIGHTS PREVIOUS RANGES RANGES
Less than 28 grams 2nd Degree Felony State Jail Felony if
less than 1 gram
2nd Degree Felony if
1 gram or more, but
less than 4 grams
28 grams or more, 5-99 years or life & 1st Degree Felony if
but less than 400 maximum $50,000 4 grams or more, but
grams fine less than 400 grams
400 grams or more 10-99 years or life & Same
maximum $100,000
fine
79. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
80. Id § 481.113.
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g. Manufacture or Delivery: Penalty Group 3 or 481
NEW WEIGHTS &
PREVIOUS WEIGHTS PREVIOUS RANGES RANGES
Less than 200 grams 3rd Degree Felony State Jail Felony if
less than 28 grams
2nd Degree Felony
if 28 grams or
more, but less than
200 grams
200 grams or more, 5-99 years or life & 1st Degree Felony
but less than 400 maximum $50,000
grams fine
400 grams or more 10-99 years or life Same
& maximum
$100,000 fine
h. Possession of Marihuana 82
PREVIOUS NEW WEIGHTS &
WEIGHTS PREVIOUS RANGES RANGES
2 ounces or less Class B Misdemeanor Same
4 ounces or less, Class A Misdemeanor Same
but more than 2
ounces
5 pounds or less, 3rd Degree Felony State Jail Felony
but more than 4
ounces
50 pounds or 2nd Degree Felony 3rd Degree Felony
less, but more
than 5 pounds
200 pounds or 5-99 years or life & 2nd Degree Felony if
less, but more maximum $50,000 fine 2000 pounds or less,
than 50 pounds but more than 50
pounds
2000 pounds or 10-99 years or life & 2nd Degree Felony if
less, but more maximum $100,000 fine 2000 pounds or less,
than 200 pounds but more than 50
pounds
More than 2000 15-99 years or life & 5-99 years or life &
pounds maximum $250,000 fine maximum $50,000
fine
81. Id. § 481.114.
82. 1d § 481.121.
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i. Delivery of Marihuana 83
NEW WEIGHTS &
PREVIOUS WEIGHTS PREVIOUS RANGES RANGES
1/4 of an ounce or Class B Misdemeanor Same
less
Class A Misdemeanor Same
if remuneration
4 ounces or less, 3rd Degree Felony State Jail Felony if
but more than 1/4 5 pounds or less,
of an ounce but more than 1/4
of an ounce
5 pounds or less, 2nd Degree Felony State Jail Felony if
but more than 4 5 pounds or less,
ounces but more than 1/4
of an ounce
50 pounds or less, 1st Degree Felony 2nd Degree Felony
but more than 5
pounds
200 pounds or less, 5-99 years or life & 1st Degree Felony
but more than 50 maximum $50,000 if 2000 pounds or
pounds fine less, but more
than 50 pounds
2000 pounds or less, 10-99 years or life & 1st Degree Felony
but more than 200 maximum $100,000 if 2000 pounds or
pounds fine less, but more
than 50 pounds
More than 2000 15-99 years or life & 10-99 years or life
pounds maximum $250,000 & maximum
fine $100,000 fine
II. SIGNIFICANT CASE LAW
The 1993-94 term of the Court of Criminal Appeals saw a continuation
of the moderate trend of decisionmaking that often springs from a fairly
philosophically balanced judicial body. The continuation of frequent per-
sonnel changes, this time in the form of Steve Mansfield and Sharon Kel-
ler replacing Chuck Miller and Chuck Campbell on January 1, 1995, once
again impairs predictability of future decisions. But, for the present, the
court was able to add another layer of interpretation over the ever-chang-
ing landscape of criminal law. The highlights of this court term include: a
declaration that pen registers (a modified telephone tap) could constitute
an unconstitutional search under Article I, section 9 of the Texas Consti-
tution, even though the United States Supreme Court had held that they
83. Id. § 481.120.
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were unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment;84 liberalized rules
for granting writs of mandamus against a trial judge that benefit the pros-
ecution; 85 a new remedy at the trial level for Batson error;86 cases that
construe seven of the most frequently-used rules of criminal evidence, as
well as clarify the correct way to publish evident to a jury;87 and a decla-
ration that DWI roadblocks are unconstitutional. 88
A. PRETRIAL AREAS
1. Search and Seizure
a. Pen Registers and the Texas Constitution
Richardson v. State89 involved the use of telephone pen registers by the
police and whether such use constituted a search.90 Article 18.21 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows a court ordered pen register
without a showing of probable cause. 91 Such an order was secured in this
case for a jail phone, and the list of numbers called was used to provide
probable cause to obtain a wiretap under article 18.20.92 The court of
appeals held that there is never a reasonable expectation of privacy in
numbers dialed under either the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution or article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution because a person
conveys the numbers dialed to the telephone company. 93 The Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed, holding under the Texas Constitution that
phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy that phone num-
bers dialed will remain private. 94 Criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court's
Smith case authorizing the wholesale use of pen registers by the police,
the court recounted that seven states had rejected Smith in interpreting
their own constitutions and that many authors, including Wayne LaFave
and Clifford Fishman, have attacked the reasoning in Smith.95 Finally,
the court performed its own analysis on the expectation of privacy and
concluded that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's opinion in Smith,
"society recognizes as objectively reasonable the expectation of the tele-
phone customer that the numbers he dials as a necessary incident of his
use of the telephone will not be published to the rest of the world."
96
Thus, the use of a pen register may well constitute a search under article
84. See Part II.A.l.a., infra.
85. See Part II.F.., infra.
86. See Part II.F.1., infra.
87. See Part II.G.5., infra.
88. See Part II.G.8., infra.
89. 865 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
90. Id.
91. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
92. Richardson, 865 S.W.2d at 946. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 18.20
(Vernon Supp. 1995).
93. Richardson, 865 S.W.2d at 949 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743
(1979)).
94. Id. at 953.
95. Id. at 949-53.
96. Id. at 953.
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I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. The Court of Criminal Appeals,
however, remanded the case to the court of appeals to see if, among other
things, a reasonable expectation of privacy existed in the use of a jail
telephone. 97
2. Article 38.23, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., and the Attenuation
of the Taint Doctrine
The federal exclusionary rule mandates that all evidence obtained as a
result of an illegal arrest (the fruit of the poison tree) is tainted by the
arrest.98 However, just because a confession, for instance, is obtained at a
point in time after an illegal arrest does not mean that it must be ex-
cluded; rather, a four-part test per Brown v. Illinois99 is to be used to see
if the "taint" has been "attenuated" by intervening events.' 00 In State v.
Johnson'0' the court specifically held that the attenuation doctrine is ap-
plicable to our Texas codification of the exclusionary rule102 that prohib-
its admission of evidence obtained in violation of the law.103 In Garcia v.
State 04 the inevitable discovery doctrine was held not to be an exception
to article 38.23.105 Garcia held that, since the legislature did not expressly
create any exceptions to the exclusionary rule, no exceptions would be
created by judicial fiat. °6 Here, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals
found that, while it is true that the attenuation doctrine is not an excep-
tion to article 38.23, it is also true that evidence is not really "obtained"
from the arrest, provided that the evidence is sufficiently attenuated from
the illegal arrest.10 7 Thus, the attenuation doctrine is a viable theory of
admission of evidence lawfully acquired at a point in time after an illegal
arrest.
3. Fruits of a Federal Search Warrant Admissible in State Court,
Though Warrant not in Compliance with Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure
In State v. Toone'08 the federal government, knowing that the defend-
ant was about to possess obscene magazines at his home, obtained a fed-
eral anticipatory search warrant to search for the obscene materials as
soon as they arrived.109 They knew the defendant was going to possess
obscene magazines because the government, through the post office, was
97. Id. at 954.
98. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975).
99. Id.
100. ld
101. 871 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
102. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
103. 871 S.W.2d at 750-51.
104. 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
105. Id. at 800.
106. Id. at 798-800.
107. 871 S.W.2d at 750-51.
108. 872 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
109. Id. at 750-51.
1094 [Vol. 48
CRIMINAL LAW
about to deliver them to him via the regular mail service.110 The defend-
ant was prosecuted in state court for possession of cocaine that was seized
during the search."' The defense argued that procurement of the war-
rant under these circumstances violated chapter 18 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure since, at the time the warrant was issued, there was no
contraband in the home. 112 Therefore, the evidence seized pursuant to
that warrant should arguably be excluded under the Texas exclusionary
rule. 113 The Court of Criminal Appeals simply stated that article 18.01
does not govern federal search warrants.1 4 Therefore, whether the war-
rant procurement complies with state law is irrelevant. The court, how-
ever, dodged the question of whether state anticipatory search warrants
can be in compliance with Texas state law.' 15
B. JEOPARDY
1. A Sua Sponte Mistrial for Manifest Necessity Does not Bar a Retrial
After jeopardy attached in Alvarez v. State,116 the trial judge deter-
mined that reversible error had occurred during the voir dire process. 117
The judge then declared a mistrial and the defendant pled jeopardy as a
bar to retrial. 18 The Court of Criminal Appeals first noted that a mistrial
declared for manifest necessity does not create a jeopardy bar." 9
Whatever manifest necessity means, the facts of this case fit the defini-
tion. 20 It would be a senseless waste of judicial resources to continue a
trial after an obvious procedural or other error has occured that necessi-
tates reversal on appeal (that is, making reversal a certainty). 121 In this
case, the error that the trial judge worried about was indeed reversible on
appeal because it involved comments that were not susceptible to even a
curative instruction. 22 Thus, the record supported the trial court's deter-
mination of manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. 23
2. No Jeopardy Bar to Lesser Included Charge After Acquittal of
Greater Charge in a Non-Jury Trial
In Ex Parte Shute' 24 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a reversal
for insufficient evidence after a bench trial did not bar a retrial for a
110. Id. at 750.
111. Id. at 751.
112. Id
113. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
114. 827 S.W.2d at 752.
115. Id
116. 864 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
117. Id. at 65-66.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 65.
120. Id. at 65-66.
121. 864 S.W.2d at 66.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 877 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
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lesser included offense.' 25 In Granger v. State126 the court previously
held that if a conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence in a jury trial,
retrial of a lesser offense is not barred by a jeopardy claim if: 1) sufficient
evidence was introduced at the first trial to prove the lesser offense, and
2) the jury was instructed on the lesser offense in the charge and given the
opportunity to convict the defendant of the charge at that time.127 The
theory is that the State prosecutes for a primary offense and all secondary
(that is, lesser) offenses every time it goes to trial. If no charge is submit-
ted on a lesser offense in a jury trial, the State is deemed to have aban-
doned it without manifest necessity after jeopardy has attached. 128 This
theory, however, does not apply in a bench trial where there is no charge
because the trial judge, without any instructions, is empowered to find a
defendant guilty of any lesser charges. 129
C. INDICTMENTS AND INFORMATIONS
1. Specificity Required in the Face of a Motion to Quash
The defendant in State v. Kinsey130 was charged with criminal tres-
pass. 31 The defendant filed a motion to quash because the information
failed to state an offense.' 32 Specifically, the State had pleaded "owner
thereof" instead of tracking the statute by pleading "of another.' 33 The
trial court granted defendant's motion, and the court of appeals af-
firmed. 13 The Court of Criminal Appeals began by stating that, if statu-
tory words have a technical meaning, they cannot be replaced by other
words in a pleading.135 A caveat to this rule, however, is that if words
equivalent to the common everyday usage of the technical term were also
equivalent to the definition of the technical term in the Penal Code, sub-
stitution is allowed.' 36 The word "another" is technically defined as "a
person other than the actor" and is equivalent to the common everyday
usage of the word.137 Since substitution of a term that has the same
meaning is allowed and "owner" conveys the same meaning and includes
the sense of the statutory word "another," the substitution was
allowed. 138
125. Id. at 315.
126. 850 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
127. Id at 519-20.
128. Id.
129. 314 S.W.2d at 315.




134. Id. at 384.
135. 861 S.W.2d at 384.
136. Id
137. Id. (citing TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(4)).
138. 861 S.W.2d at 384-85. Note that the defendant's main complaint was that he was
joint owner of the property trespassed upon, and thus, he could not be convicted under the
"another" wording since he owned, at least in part, the property. Id. However, since the
statutory term "owner" includes "greater right to possession than the actor" language, he
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Generally, an indictment that tracks the statutory language will survive
a motion to quash.' 39 Furthermore, when a term is defined by statute it
does not need to be defined again in the indictment. 140 However, "if the
statutory language is not completely descriptive of the offense, then addi-
tional specificity will be required in the face of a motion to quash."141
Olurebi v. State' 42 involved credit card abuse by use of a fictitious credit
card.' 43 The Court of Criminal Appeals began by holding that a credit
card can be fictitious in two ways: 1) it is not issued by the owner (for
example, Chevron), or 2) it is issued to a nonexistent cardholder. 144 The
court then held that a failure to define "fictitious credit card" in the face
of a motion to quash, that complains of insufficient notice of the offense
charged, rendered the indictment deficient. 145 The indictment, however,
is not insufficient enough to amount to reversible error.' There must
also be an inquiry as to whether, in the context of the case, this
prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant. 47 Therefore, the case
was remanded to the court of appeals for a harm analysis.' 48 Harm is
examined from the standpoint of whether the error impacted the defend-
ant's ability to prepare a defense and, if so, to what extent.' 49
2. Indictment Confers Jurisdiction, but not for Unauthorized Visiting
Judges
Article V, section 12 of the Texas Constitution confers jurisdiction on a
court upon the return of an indictment or information. In Johnston v.
State' 50 a substitute judge, who could not lawfully sit on that bench, was
brought into a driving while intoxicated case.' 5' The Court of Criminal
Appeals held that Article V, section 12 did not confer jurisdiction on the
court because "in order to constitute a court, a duly authorized officer
must be present at the time and place appointed by law.' 52 Thus, once
the substitute judge took a seat, the court was technically no longer
a court.' 53 Therefore, Article V, section 12 did not confer jurisdic-
could be convicted under that wording if he had a lesser right to possession than the person
bringing the charges. Id. Accordingly, the court held that "owner" requires a higher bur-
den of proof than "another." Id. Consequently, the State presumably could not obtain a
conviction under the "greater right to possession" theory if they could not use that theory
to convict under the word "another." Id.
139. Olurebi v. State, 870 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Tex. Crim App. 1994).
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing De Vaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).
142. 870 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
143. 870 S.W.2d at 58.
144. Id. at 60.
145. Id. at 61.
146. Id.
147. Id
148. 870 S.W.2d at 62.
149. Id at 61.
150. 869 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
151. Id. at 349.
152. Id at 350.
153. Id. at 350.
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tion.154 Because the error was jurisdictional, it could be raised for the
first time on appeal. 155
3. Correcting a Defendant's Name Is not an Amendment
Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 26.07 and 26.08, if
the defendant's name is incorrect as shown on the indictment, it must be
corrected to reflect his true name.' 56 Wynn v. State157 simply holds that
the correction of a defendant's name is not an amendment of an indict-
ment (or information) under article 28.10. Consequently, the features of
chapter 28 (mandatory continuances, etc.) do not apply.
D. MOTION TO SUPPRESS HEARING
1. Hearsay not Admissible
Hearsay evidence is not admissible in a motion to suppress hearing. In
McVickers v. State158 the testifying officer possessed only hearsay knowl-
edge about why other officers stopped the defendant's car and the legal-
ity of that stop. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 1101(d)(4) specifically
applies the rules of evidence (including article VIII Hearsay) to motions
to suppress confessions or other illegally obtained evidence under Code
of Criminal Procedure section 38.23. The court noted that hearsay is
otherwise generally admissible in motions to suppress matters other than
article 38.23 matters (for example, a magistrate testifying about hearsay
furnishing probable cause to issue an arrest warrant).' 59
E. GuiLTY PLEA
1. Adequacy of Admonishment Vis-A-Vis U.S. Citizenship
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 26.13, entitled Plea of Guilty,
requires several admonishments. One requires a defendant must be ad-
vised that his plea could result in his deportation or denial of naturaliza-
tion, if he is not a United States citizen.' 60 In Morales v. State161 the
parties agreed that such an admonishment was not given. The court of
criminal appeals reversed, holding that a complete failure to give this ad-
monishment is reversible error.1 62 However, the harmless error rule ap-
plies. Thus, the fact that the record did not reveal whether the defendant
was in fact a United States citizen was immaterial. Substantial compli-
154. Id.
155. 869 S.W.2d at 350.
156. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 26.07, 26.08 (Vernon 1989).
157. 864 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
158. 874 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
159. See TEX. R. CRIM. EviD. 104(a). This holding does not affect an officer's ability to
narrate what an informant or eyewitness said to him that furnished probable cause. This is
true because whatever was said in such a conversation is not offered to prove that it was
the truth, only that the words were spoken and the officer relied on them to form probable
cause. Thus, this would not be hearsay.
160. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(4) (Vernon 1989).
161. 872 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
162. Id. at 754-55.
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ance with the article does not hinge on whether or not the admonishment
made a difference to the defendant.
F. MANDAMUS
1. New Rules Liberalize when an Appellate Court Will Correct a Trial
Judge's Ruling by Mandamus
Under the holding of Curry v. Gray163 a judge could make a wrong call
on a motion (for example, granting a motion when he should have, under
established case law, overruled it), and an appellate court would not en-
tertain a writ of mandamus to correct that call. As long as the judge had
the authority to make a ruling, the losing party's only recourse was ap-
peal. Now, under Healey v. McMeans164 if there is clear binding prece-
dent contrary to the judge's ruling, mandamus will lie. "Trial judges do
not enjoy the freedom to ignore the law.' 165 In other words, if the trial
judge's ruling on the law is obviously wrong, a writ of mandamus will
issue. It is important to note that only the State is able to meet the other
prerequisite for a writ of mandamus; there is no adequate remedy at law.
The defense, having the right to appeal all rulings, generally will have to
wait until the appeal to complain.
G. TRIAL
1. Jury Selection
a. Batson Error in a Capital Case
The Court of Criminal Appeals held in Butler v. State' 66 that article
35.261 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not govern Batson error
in a capital trial. Therefore, the trial court does not have to dismiss all the
jurors summoned if Batson error occurs.
b. Batson Violation -Disallowing the Strike Is a Proper Remedy
Article 35.261 calls for a dismissal of the panel when a Batson defense
motion is granted due to the State's exercise of a preemptory strike based
upon race. However, in Curry v. Bowman, 167 the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that another proper remedy would be to disallow the strike
and seat the juror if the defense makes their motion under Batson rather
than under article 35.261.
2. Claiming Fifth Amendment Privilege not to Testify
b. Testing Frivolity in an Informant Case
The trial court in Reese v. State' 68 allowed the State's informant to
claim his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify in the face of an en-
163. 726 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
164. 884 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
165. Id. at 774.
166. 872 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
167. 885 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
168. 877 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
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trapment defense during this drug sale case.169 The defense complained
that the court did not conduct a meaningful examination into the legiti-
macy of the informant's claim of privilege. In fact, the trial judge failed to
inquire about the legitimacy of the claim at all; he simply honored the
claim when the informant asserted it. The Court of Criminal Appeals,
citing with approval the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Hoff-
man v. United States,170 held that "[t]o sustain the privilege, it need only
be evident from the implications or the question, in the setting in which it
is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of
why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclo-
sure could result.' 171 In appraising the claim, the trial judge "must be
governed ... by his personal perceptions of the peculiarities of the case"
as well as the facts in evidence.' 7 2 This language, of course, highly sanc-
tions the abuse of discretion standard of review for this kind of decision.
Still, discretion can be abused. In this case, the informant was so heavily
involved in the drug sale that he was considered a state agent and, gener-
ally, state agents cannot be prosecuted for crimes sanctioned by police.
However, because it is possible that informants may be prosecuted for
acts related to the subject offense, the court should still inquire whether
an informant's answers are privileged or not privileged and compel ques-
tioning and answering in front of the jury in appropriate areas of testi-
mony. Because the judge did not make such an inquiry of the state agent/
informant and the defense raised the issue of entrapment, the judge
should have allowed the questioning.
3. Witnesses
a. State's Use of Perjured Testimony and Who Has to Know About
It
Ex parte Castellano173 concerned the tainting of the State's testimony
by perjury. The Court of Criminal Appeals took this opportunity to reaf-
firm several maxims:
1. Due process is violated if the prosecutor knowingly uses perjured ma-
terial testimony.
2. The knowledge can be either actual or imputed, and imputed knowl-
edge will suffice where actual knowledge is absent.
3. Active or passive use of perjured testimony will suffice to invoke the
doctrine.
4. A police officer's knowledge of perjury will be imputed to the prosecu-
tor if the officer is part of the prosecution team, either directly or indi-
rectly because he is acting under color of law.
169. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112 (Vernon 1992).
170. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
171. Id. at 486-87.
172. ld at 486.
173. 863 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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5. A police officer can be acting "under color of law" even though the
officer deviates from prescribed or approved conduct (for example, by
helping to fabricate the testimony), by misusing power he possesses
solely because he is clothed with that power by the State.
174
In this case, two police officers, while carrying out a private vendetta
unrelated to their duties as police officers, framed the defendant for ar-
son. The prosecutor and other police working on the case did not know
and would not have condoned this action. Nevertheless, the knowledge
of the perjury, known only to the conspiring police officers, was imputed
to the State because of the foregoing maxims. However, the perjured
testimony must be material and harmful (that is, the court cannot say
beyond a reasonable doubt that the perjury did not contribute to the con-
viction) before a violation of the Due Process Clause is established. In
this case, the court held it was material and harmful.
175
4. Presentation Of Evidence
a. Publishing Written Evidence to the Jury after Admission
Wheatfall v. State176 allows an attorney, under the trial judge's discre-
tion, to read and explain part or all of an exhibit to a jury (or judge) after
it has been admitted. Often a party wants the jury to immediately under-
stand the contents and, therefore, the significance of a written exhibit.
Rather than have each juror read it and then pass it on to the next juror,
the attorney or sponsoring witness often reads selected portions aloud,
perhaps with explanatory comments. After this opinion, this practice is
perfectly within the trial court's discretion to allow. The attorney can
even add extra explanation and background without it being considered
testimony.
5. Evidence
a. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 404(b) -Other Crimes,
Wrongs or Acts
i. Identity Under 404(b)
The intent of Rule 404(b) is to prevent the introduction of evidence to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in con-
formity with that character. It applies equally to evidence of extraneous
acts or transactions and to evidence of extraneous offenses. Thus, even
though the acts sought to be introduced do not amount to misconduct,
their admission is still governed by Rule 404(b). In Bishop v. State177 the
State sought to introduce, via an ex-wife, evidence of acts that went to the
defendant's legal, sexual intercourse preferences because the assailant in
this sexual assault case had the same preferences. Because identity was
174. Id. at 479-84.
175. Id at 486.
176. 882 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
177. 869 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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the key to the probative value of this evidence, the court said that similar-
ity of actions is required. 178 There must be, in other words, a signature
apparent when comparing the circumstances. Using an act to prove iden-
tity requires a much higher degree of similarity to the circumstances of
the charged offense than extraneous acts offered for other purposes such
as intent. Furthermore, although Montgomery v. State179 suggested that
such evidence would be admissible if relevant, the probative value of the
evidence must be weighed against its prejudicial effect. Under the facts
of Bishop, the prejudicial effect of the evidence was high and its probative
value was so low that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
evidence.
b. Abuse of Discretion in Enforcing "The Rule," Texas Rule of
Criminal Evidence 613
In Davis v. State'80 the defendant's mother watched a portion of the
trial before the defendant's attorney noticed and had her removed from
the courtroom. Later, the defense sought to call her as a witness, but she
was prevented from testifying by the trial judge when the State reminded
the court that "The Rule" had been invoked. The mother had not been
sworn at the time she was in the court room, but all parties correctly
assumed that the Rule applied anyway. The Court of Criminal Appeals,
however, found reversible error. Citing Webb v. State' 8' the court applied
a two part test that is used when the Rule has been technically violated.
First, did circumstances exist to justify exclusion (other than the technical
violation), such as a showing that the defendant knew that the violation
was occurring and aided the violation? 182 Second, if not, was the ex-
cluded testimony crucial to the defense? 183 Here, the violation was inno-
cent and the mother possessed crucial testimony; someone else confessed
to her that they, and not her son, committed the offense.
c. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 613, the "Rule," Is Mandatory,
but the Harmless Error Rule Applies
On its face, Rule 613 (the Rule) mandates that the trial court exclude
witnesses at the request of a party. The defense in Moore v. State' 84 made
such a request, but the trial judge denied it for purposes of expediency.
Accordingly, the judge allowed the State's expert witness to remain in the
courtroom and hear the defense's expert witness, and vice-versa. The
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Rule is no longer discretionary;
rather, under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Evidence it is mandatory. 185
178. Id. at 346.
179. 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
180. 872 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
181. 766 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
182. Id. at 241.
183. Id. at 242.
184. 882 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
185. Id at 848.
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However, since both experts' opinions were not based on the other's tes-
timony (predictably they disagreed about future dangerousness), the
court held beyond a reasonable doubt that each expert's testimony was
not affected by the others. 186 The court noted in a footnote, however,
that the witness could have remained in the courtroom as a person whose
presence was essential to the presentation of a party's cause. 187
d. Admissibility of Expert Testimony under Texas Rule of Criminal
Evidence 702
In Yount v. State,8 8 a sexual child abuse case, the State's expert was
asked: how many false accusations have resulted from the hundreds of
interviews and examinations of children who claimed to have been sexu-
ally abused. 89 Over objection he answered, "very few." The Court of
Criminal Appeals held that such testimony is admissible if it is relevant
and does not cross the line of actually soliciting a direct opinion on the
truthfulness of the child victim. However, expert testimony that a partic-
ular witness is truthful is inadmissible on relevancy grounds. Such an
opinion from an expert is per se so unreliable that it does not tend to
make the existence of a fact in controversy more or less probable. The
same rule applies to testimony about the credibility of a class of individu-
als. Thus, the court held that in this case, the trial court erred in admit-
ting the testimony. 190
e. Hearsay Exceptions: Rule 803(8)(B) - Autopsy Report Is
Admissible
Garcia v. State'91 involved the admission of autopsy reports under the
hearsay rule. 192 Rule 803(8)(B) excepts public records, other than those
of police officers and other law enforcement personnel, from the hearsay
rule if they are from public offices/agencies and set forth matters the of-
fice has a duty to report. To begin with, a medical examiner is required in
counties of more than one million people and is, therefore, a public
agency. 193 Additionally, medical examiners have a statutory duty to pre-
pare and file several reports, 194 including autopsies. 95 Therefore, autop-
sies are public records. Finally, medical examiners are not law
enforcement personnel. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals held
that autopsies are admissible under Rule 803(8)(B).196
186. Id.
187. Id.; TEx. R. CRiM. EVID. 613(3).
188. 872 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
189. Id. at 707.
190. Id at 712.
191. 868 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
192. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 802.
193. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 49.25, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
194. Id §§ 6 & 9.
195. Id. art. 49.24, § 11.
196. 868 S.W.2d at 342.
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f. Amount of Corroboration Necessary for Admission of a Rule
803(24) Statement (Declaration Against Penal Interests)
In Davis v. State'97 a friend of the defendant told the defendant's
mother that he, not the defendant, had sold the drugs. When the mother
tried to testify to this, the trial court sustained the State's hearsay objec-
tion. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, noting that the statement
obviously was a statement against penal interests, since it admitted a
crime and no circumstances existed (such as immunity) that would negate
the conclusion that a reasonable man would not have made the statement
unless he believed it to be true. 198
Still, Texas Rule of Evidence 803(24) requires corroboration if the
statement is to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The test
for corroboration is that all corroborating and non-corroborating circum-
stances must be considered together to determine if the evidence of cor-
roborating circumstances clearly indicates the trustworthiness of the
statement against penal interests. In making such a determination, the
trial judge must not weigh the credibility of the witnesses, but take their
testimony as true. Here, under the facts of the case, the circumstances
clearly indicated trustworthiness. Four alibi witnesses were presented, as
well as a fifth witness who said the friend was the one who sold the drugs.
g. Dying Declarations under Rule 804(b)(2)
Prior to the adoption of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 804(b)(2), a
declarant's hearsay statements could be admitted as dying declarations if
evidence existed that the decedent believed at the time he made the
statement that (1) death was imminent and (2) there was no hope of re-
covery.199 Rule 804(b)(2) has dropped the latter requirement. It pro-
vides for admission of a deceased's statement, concerning the cause or
circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death, so long as
he believed his death was imminent.200 In Burks v. State20 a doctor testi-
fied that, at the time the deceased statement's were made, there was a
chance the deceased would recover. The doctor was wrong, of course.
However, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the State no longer
has a burden to prove the deceased held out no hope of recovery and
now only has to prove that the deceased believed his death was immi-
nent.202 This burden was satisfied by statements of the deceased such as
"I am dying" and "[t]hey hit me in my heart. 20 3
197. 872 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
198. Id. at 747.
199. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.20 (Vernon 1979) (now TEX. RULE CRIM.
EVID. 804(b)(2)).
200. TEX. R. CRiM. EVID. 804(b)(2).
201. 876 S.W.2d 877. (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
202. Id. at 901.
203. Id. at 902.
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h. Authentication of Video Tape under Rule 901
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 901, entitled Requirement of Authen-
tication or Identification, now governs the admissibility of video tapes.
The rule is satisfied by any evidence "sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims" 204 (that is, testimony
by a witness with personal knowledge).
In Kephart v. State,20 5 the State attempted to verify a video tape by
calling the officer who seized it from one of the defendants. The tape
depicted several people using drugs. The officer was able to testify only
that this was the tape he took from a defendant's video camera and that
the defendant appeared to be depicted on the tape. He had no personal
knowledge of where or when the tape had been made and could not state
that it depicted the actual scene or event at the time it occurred. Noting
that video tapes can easily be altered (for example, timing), the court
held that the officer's testimony was wholly insufficient to authenticate
the tape and, thus, could not provide a predicate for the tape's admissibil-
ity.20 6 This is not to say that only a witness who was present when a video
tape was made can authenticate it, but the authenticating witness must be
able to say that the video accurately depicts the scene in question. In
other words, the video is pictorial testimony of the witness' testimony.
Thus, if the officer had been to the defendant's home, he could view, for
the first time, a video of that home and say that the video accurately
depicts the home. A home is static, however, while a scene portraying
people is not.20 7
6. Jury Instructions
a. Must Limit the Definitions of Culpable Mental States Where
Appropriate
In Cook v. State,208 a murder case, the defense requested that the defi-
nitions of "intentionally" and "knowingly," given in the abstract portion
of the charge to the jury, be limited "to the result of the offense only,"
since murder is a result-type crime (that is, the defendant must intention-
ally or knowingly cause the result).209 Citing numerous cases requiring
that the Penal Code definitions of the culpable mental states in result-
type offenses be limited to one of their component parts (either the na-
ture of conduct, the circumstances surrounding conduct or the result of
conduct), the court reaffirmed the rule and overruled prior language to
204. TEX. R. CRIm. EvID. 901(a).
205. 875 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
206. Id. at 322.
207. See Stapleton v. State, 868 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (electronic record-
ings are also governed by Rule 901). Note also that Rule 803(6), the business records
exception to the hearsay rule, may be used where applicable to admit video or electronic
recordings (e.g. security cameras).
208. 884 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
209. Id. at 486. This case gives an excellent recapitulation of the concept of mens rea
and the culpable mental states in the Penal Code.
1995] 1105
SMU LAW REVIEW
the contrary.210 Therefore, in all result-type offenses (such as murder,
injury to a child, and injury to the elderly), the trial judge should limit the
general definition of the applicable culpable mental states to the result of
the conduct. A failure to do so results in charge error and harm will be
decided under Almanza v. State.21 1 The "some harm" test will apply if
there is an objection, and the "egregious harm" test will apply if there is
no objection.
7. Jury Deliberations
a. Reading Testimony to the Jury - How Much Should You Read?
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.28 instructs the trial judge
to read only the portion of the testimony that is in dispute.212 In Brown
v. State213 the jury note asked who a particular witness said was in the
bathroom. Over a general objection that too much was being read, the
trial judge not only read the testimony about who was in the bathroom,
but also who shot whom. To do otherwise would have meant cutting and
pasting testimony. The Court of Criminal Appeals said that although
some questions and answers did not show who was in the bathroom
(rather the questions went to other matters like who was shooting), those
parts were arguably necessary to put the purely germane questions and
answers in context.2 14 Therefore, it was proper.
215
b. Reading Testimony to the Jury - Should You?
In State v. Moore216 an insistent jury kept requesting that the court
read the testimony of a particular witness. The defendant objected be-
cause the jury notes did not explicitly demonstrate that a disagreement
existed. Article 36.28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a
reading may be done "if the jury disagree[s]. ' '217 The Court of Criminal
Appeals stated that a simple request for reading of testimony does not
reflect, implicitly or otherwise, disagreement. A trial judge may inform
the jury of this rule, however, and if the jury then complies with article
36.28, the reading can commence. In this case, the defendant's objection
should have been sustained.
210. Id. at 486-89.
211. 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
212. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.28 (Vernon 1981).
213. 870 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
214. Id. at 56.
215. If the defendant had objected to specific questions and answers being read back
(separate objection for each question and answer), one at a time, in which he felt exceeded
the bounds of the jury's request, a more detailed analysis would have been applied to the
trial judge's actions. But here, the lump sum of the testimony read to the jury either an-
swered the question or put the answers in context.
216. 874 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
217. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 36.28 (Vernon 1981).
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& Specific Crimes and Specialty Law
a. Trespassing Indictment - Alleging "Owner" instead of "Of
Another" Is Sufficient
The State in Arnold v. State218 pleaded that the defendant entered or
remained (that is, trespassed) on property owned by a named individual.
The trespassing statute, of course, uses the wording "entered or remained
on property of another. '219 The Court of Criminal Appeals said that al-
leging "owner" is sufficient and the State may prove ownership by prov-
ing a greater right to possession.220 This effectively solves some proof
problems in the "of another" pleadings where, as here, the property was a
federal courthouse which is, in a sense, owned by all of its citizens.
b. "Voluntary" under section 6.01(a) of the Penal Code Relates
only to Physical Actions
Section 6.01(a) of the Penal Code states that a person commits an of-
fense "only if he voluntarily engages in conduct."'221 In Alford v. State222
the court held that the word "voluntary" does not encompass any type of
mental element in the nature of free will concept, but rather relates only
to a physical element.223 Accidental acts, omissions or possessions are
therefore covered, but nothing broader (such as things done under duress
or coercion). According to the court, dictionary definitions that mentally
equate voluntary with intentional are broader than the legislature in-
tended when it wrote section 6.01(a). 224
c. DWI Roadblocks Are per se Unconstitutional
The Court of Criminal Appeals held in Holt v. State225 that, until the
legislature implements a statewide policy/plan sanctioning police road-
blocks set up for the purpose of detecting driving while intoxicated of-
fenses, such roadblocks violate the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 226 Whether they offend the Texas Constitution and
whether legislative sanction would cure such an offense are questions left
unanswered because they were not reached by the court. This 6-3 deci-
sion is likely headed for the United States Supreme Court because it in-
terprets Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz. 227
218. 867 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
219. Id
220. Id. at 379.
221. Id.
222. 866 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
223. Id. at 624.
224. Id.
225. 887 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
226. Id. at 19.
227. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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d. Crimes of Omission - Duty to Act in a Cohabitation Abuse
Situation
The defendant in Hawkins v. State228 lived with his girlfriend and her
infant son. The girlfriend, on three different occasions, picked the baby
up by its clothing and threw or dropped him onto a couch or bed. The
defendant boyfriend did not remove the little boy from the mother after
the third occasion. Therefore, in a prosecution for the fourth occasion
(the mother swung the child around by its heels and its head struck the
furniture once, causing injury), the boyfriend was convicted of injury to a
child because he failed to remove the child from the presence of its abu-
sive mother.
The Court of Criminal Appeals found that under Texas Penal Code
section 22.04(b)(2), a person who assumes "care, custody, or control of a
child" becomes subject to the "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, by
omission, causes to a child ... injury" language of the statute. 229 Ignoring
the lower court of appeals and the dissent's finding that the defendant
had no legal means to remove the child from its mother in this situation,
the court found the evidence sufficient to convict the defendant because
he had assumed "care, custody, or control of" the infant by cohabitating
with its mother.230
e. DWI - HGN Test Approved for Use in Court
The "Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test," or HGN test, is now a valid
test and admissible under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702 and
Emerson v. State.2 31 The Court of Criminal Appeals took judicial notice
of the general validity of the HGN test and the theory upon which it is
based. The dissenting opinions (this was a 5-4 case) noted that this repre-
sented a quantum leap in judicial notice taking.232 Pronouncing that the
test is a reliable indicator of intoxication, the court approved of its use in
this case because the administering officer qualified as an expert on the
HGN test (specifically concerning its administration and technique). 233
A police officer qualifies as an expert by receiving a certificate from the
state. Still, the test has yet to be correlated to the blood alcohol content
in a particular case.
H. POST TRIAL
1. Appeals
a. Appeal after Guilty Plea in a Negotiated (Plea Bargained) Case
In a plea in which the judge follows the plea bargain, Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 40(b)(1) prohibits appeal of nonjurisdictional de-
228. No. 954-93, 1994 WL 274413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
229. Id. at *1.
230. Id. at *5.
231. 880 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
232. Id. at 770-71 (Clinton, J., dissenting); id at 772 (Baird, J., dissenting).
233. Id at 769.
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fects or non-pretrial motion rulings unless the judge permits the appeal.
In Davis v. State234 the defendant attempted to appeal sufficiency, which
was a nonjurisdictional error that occurred after the entry of the guilty
plea. The Court of Criminal Appeals said that, under prior case law and
according to plain language, Rule 40(b)(1) covers all nonjurisdictional er-
rors that occur before and after the plea, as well as any type of error
occurring prior to the plea.235 Thus, sufficiency cannot be appealed with-
out the judge's permission.236
b. Appeal of Errors Committed after the Entry of a Non-
Negotiated Plea
The defendant in Jack v. State237 pleaded guilty to the court, and the
State put on two witnesses to testify about extraneous offenses. There
was no plea agreement. When the judge gave the defendant sixty years,
the defendant took offense and appealed, complaining of the two wit-
nesses' testimony. The court of appeals said that the "Helms"238 rule ap-
plied and that all nonjurisdictional defects were waived by the plea.239
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, saying that only nonjurisdic-
tional errors occurring before entry of a negotiated guilty plea are waived
under Helms.24° There is no such jurisdictional bar to appealing matters
following a non-negotiated guilty plea.241
c. Appellate Result when Court Reporter Has Destroyed Notes
after Three Years
The defendant in Kirby v. State242 appealed when his deferred adjudi-
cation probation was revoked three years and ten days after it was given.
Predictably, there were no reporter's notes available on appeal because
they had been destroyed pursuant to Texas Government Code section
52.046(a)(4), which only requires a reporter to keep notes for three years
from the date on which they were taken.243 The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 50(e), a defend-
ant is entitled to a new trial if the notes have been "lost or destroyed
234. 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
235. Id. at 45.
236. See also Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
237. 871 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
238. Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
239. Jack v. State, No. A14-92-00685-CR, 1993 WL 93500 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.], Apr. 1, 1993), rev'd, 871 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
240. Jack, 871 S.W.2d at 742.
241. Note that appeals of negotiated pleas are governed by TEx. R. Ap. P. 40(b)(1),
which allows appeals only with the trial court's permission, except for written pre-trial
matters. Thus, in a negotiated plea, errors occurring at or after the entry of the plea cannot
be appealed absent the trial court's permission.
242. 883 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
243. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.046(a)(4) (Vernon 1988).
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without appellant's fault."'244 Consequently, the defendant received a
new trial. 245
2. Probation
a. Specificity Necessary when Ordering Community Service
When the court gave the defendant in Lemon v. State246 ten years pro-
bation, it ordered six hundred hours of community service "as directed by
the Adult Probation Officer."' 247 The Court of Criminal Appeals first re-
cited that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.12, sections
11(a)(10) and 17(a) require that a program of community service be "des-
ignated" by the court and "named in the court's order."248 Then, recog-
nizing that section 10(d) allows probation officers to transfer
probationers to a different program within the probation program, pro-
vided that the judge gives the officer such blanket power, the court held
that the initial order granting probation must, under the plain wording of
the code, designate a specific community service program or project.249
Thus, the order in this case was an improper delegation of the trial court's
responsibility in imposing conditions of probation.
3. Restitution
a. Restitution to Victims not Named in Indictment Under Article
42.12, Section 11
The Court of Criminal Appeals held in Martin v. State250 that only the
victim named in the indictment may be awarded restitution. Other vic-
tims who were defrauded or injured in the same scheme may not be in-
cluded in the restitution order.
4. Article 11.07 Habeas Corpus
a. Cognizability of Claims
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 1.13, requires that a jury
waiver be signed by the defendant.25 1 The defendant in Ex parte
Sadberry252 did not and waited until after his appeal to raise this issue via
habeas corpus. The court said that such an allegation is not cognizable
(i.e. will not be entertained) because it involves a procedural irregularity
244. Id at 670.
245. Under current law, a defendant must appeal a deferred adjudication probation
when it is imposed, not when it is revoked as was the law in this case. Consequently, while
this situation should not arise for deferred adjudications given after November of 1987 (the
effective date of the current law), this holding is still applicable to situations where an out
of time appeal is granted in, for example, a writ of habeas corpus.
246. 861 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 250.
249. Id at 251.
250. 874 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
251. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
252. 864 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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and is not "a question of constitutional dimension."253 The record was
clear that the defendant was orally admonished at the trial of his right to
a jury, and he orally waived it.
I. SELECTED U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES
1. Batson Extended to the State's Use of Preemptory Strikes in
Criminal Matters
In the now-famous opinion of J.E.B. v. Alabama,254 the Court ex-
tended its decision in Batson v. Kentucky255 to a State's use of preemp-
tory strikes based on gender. Although this case involved a civil paternity
and child support suit, the holding directly affects trials of criminal
matters.
On behalf of the mother of a minor child, the State filed a complaint
for paternity and child support against the petitioner. A panel of thirty-
six jurors was selected - twelve males and twenty-four females. After
challenges for cause, ten of the remaining thirty-three jurors were male.
The State used nine of its ten preemptory strikes to remove male jurors.
The petitioner, in turn, used all but one of his strikes to remove female
jurors. Consequently, the trial court empaneled an all-female jury.
Analogizing from Batson, the petitioner complained that the State's
strikes were exercised solely based on gender, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After a historical look
at female discrimination in the court system, Justice Blackmun, speaking
for a majority of the Court, agreed with the petitioner in that a state's use
of gender-based strikes violates the Equal Protection Clause.256
Since the issue was not before the Court in this case, the Court left
open whether this decision is limited to the government's use of gender-
based preemptory strikes. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, believes
that its decision should be limited to the government. 257 However, she
possessed little confidence that the Court would do so based on the previ-
ous holdings that have extended Batson to nongovernmental litigants.258
2. Failure to Instruct Jury on the Unavailability of Parole in the Penalty
Phase of a Capital Murder Trial Was Error when State Law
in Fact Prohibited Parole
The petitioner in Simmons v. South Carolina259 was convicted of the
murder of an elderly woman. Because of the unique nature of his mental
disorder, both prosecution and defense witnesses testified, at the penalty
253. Id. at 543.
254. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
255. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
256. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
257. ld. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
258. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (private civil
litigants are state actors when exercising preemptory strikes); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.
Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that criminal defendants are state actors).
259. 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
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phase, that the petitioner only posed a future threat to elderly women.
Therefore, he would not pose a future threat to society, as long as he
remained in prison. Due to previous convictions, the petitioner was ineli-
gible for parole, work release or supervised furlough under South Caro-
lina law and would actually spend the natural balance of his life in prison.
Because of the public's misunderstanding of the actual length of a life
sentence and the fact that defense counsel was unable to voir dire the
jurors on their interpretation of the term, defense counsel requested an
instruction be given that, in this case, life meant life. The trial court re-
fused the instruction, and the petitioner was sentenced to death.
The Supreme Court held that when a state relies on evidence of future
dangerousness, but fails to inform the jury on the unavailability of parole,
a defendant is denied due process.260 "[P]etitioner was prevented from
rebutting information that the sentencing authority considered, and upon
which it may have relied, in imposing the sentence of death."' 261 The
Court further held that the ultimate instruction given in this case (that life
imprisonment should be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning)
did not, in substance satisfy the petitioner's request for a charge on parole
inability because such an instruction does nothing to dispel the misunder-
standing reasonable jurors may have regarding the particular way that a
state defines life imprisonment. 262
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